


When IoT Attacks:

Hacking A Linux-Powered Rifle



Who are we?


- Runa A. Sandvik
- Michael Auger





Why are we doing this?

• A gun with WiFi and fancy electronics... duh

Physical











Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.1 Host is up (0.0049s latency). Not shown: 65533 filtered ports PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 80/tcp open http lighttpd |_http-methods: OPTIONS GET HEAD POST |_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html). 554/tcp open rtsp GStreamer rtspd |_rtsp-methods: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug) Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least... Device type: storage-misc|general purpose|specialized|WAP|media device|phone Running (JUST GUESSING): HP embedded (97%), Linux 2.6.X|3.X (95%)... Aggressive OS guesses: HP P2000 G3 NAS device (97%), Linux 2.6.36 - 2.6.37 (95%)

Mobile Apps



TrackingPoint App



Home	System Setting	s	
^	Connected TP_OldBetsy		
Manu	al Temperature (F)	80	>
Kill Zo	one (MOA)	4.0	>
Ammı	unition LI	RX-190	>
Recor	ding	ON	>

Settings	System Lock
<u></u>	Connected TP_OldBetsy
Passco	de
Re	emove System Passcode
C	nange System Passcode

Set the System Passcode to automatically lock the Advanced Mode after power on.

ShotView App



Public API

Mobile Apps

/clear_passcode/ /config/ /dateset/ /delete/ /dir/ /get_passcode/ /get_shot_data/ /gps/ /pkg-upload/ /progress/ /serial num/ /service/ /set_factory_defaults/ /set_passcode/ /set_windage/ /unwatch/ /updatescope/ /version/


Config

/set_ammunition/
/set_imagestab/
/set_killzone/
/set_temperature/
/set_record_cooltime/
/set_recording/


Initial Findings

- SSID contains the serial number, can't be changed
- WPA2 key can't be changed
- VLC or anything can stream the scope view
- Advanced mode lock is only a 4 digit pin and can be brute forced
- API is un-authenticated
- API settings can be modified regardless of advanced mode lock

Courtesy of TrackingPoint's Website




Courtesy of TrackingPoint's Website



Tearing it open




Courtesy of TrackingPoint's YouTube





Close Up



UART

Woot!

```
U-Boot 2010.06-00300-gfb2cb26 (Jul 10 2013 - 17:39:57)
TI8148-GP rev 2.1
ARM clk: 600MHz
DDR clk: 400MHz
I2C:
      ready
DRAM: 512 MiB
Flash: 16 MiB
TTTTTT RRRR
             AA
                  CCC K K III N N GGG PPPP
                                                000 III N N TTTTTT
 TT R R A A C
                      к к
                             I NN NG
                                          P PO O I
                                                        NN N
                                                               TΤ
 TΤ
      RRRR
           AAAA C
                      КК
                             I NNNG GG PPPP O O I NNN
                                                               ΤT
            A A C
                      К К
                             IN NNG GP
                                               O O I N NN
                                                               TΤ
 TT RR
 TT R RR A A CCC K K III N N GGG P
                                                000 III N N TT
                      SHOT. MADE!
MMC: OMAP SD/MMC: 0
Net: MAC:7c:66:9d:41:8:88 Dev:cpsw
Hit any key to stop autoboot: 0
Booting side 2
## Booting kernel from Legacy Image at 08360000 ...
  Image Name: Linux-2.6.37
              ARM Linux Kernel Image (uncompressed)
  Image Type:
              2314892 Bytes = 2.2 MiB
  Data Size:
  Load Address: 80008000
  Entry Point: 80008000
  Loading Kernel Image ... OK
OK
Starting kernel ...
```

Well played TrackingPoint...

usbcore: registered new interface driver ath9k_htc usb 2-1.2: ath9k_htc: Transferred FW: htc_9271.fw, size: 51272 ath9k_htc 2-1.2:1.0: ath9k_htc: HTC initialized with 33 credits ath9k_htc 2-1.2:1.0: ath9k_htc: FW Version: 1.3 ieee80211 phy0: Atheros AR9271 Rev:1 Enabling iptables... ip_tables: (C) 2000-2006 Netfilter Core Team nf_conntrack version 0.5.0 (3969 buckets, 15876 max) Starting portmap daemon: portmap. Caching udev devnodes INIT: Entering runlevel: 5 Starting Dropbear SSH server: NET: Registered protocol family 10 dropbear. Starting Lighttpd Web Server: lighttpd.



SHOT. MADE.

Linux TP_TP750-308FF89765R 2.6.37

Arago 2011.09 TP_TP750-308FF89765R tty00

TP_TP750-308FF89765R login:


...well played



TrackingPoint wins!

- Validating API input
- GPG signed and encrypted updates
- Password Protected Console

Let's get destructive!




The Real Filesystem



Had only we known!







Admin API

Mobile Apps

/clear_passcode/ /config/ /dateset/ /delete/ /dir/ /get_passcode/ /get_shot_data/ /gps/ /pkg-upload/ /progress/ /serial_num/ /service/ /set_factory_defaults/ /set_passcode/ /set_windage/ /unwatch/ /updatescope/ /version/

Config

/set_ammunition/
/set_imagestab/
/set_killzone/
/set_temperature/
/set_record_cooltime/
/set_recording/

Admin

/compmode/
/get_imu/
/powermgr/
/set_advanced_mode/
/set_pgf/
/set_tiltadjust/
/set_wifi/
/ssh_accept/

• • •

Demo: Got root?

Demo: You missed!

Findings

- Admin API is un-authenticated
- Un-authenticated access to core system functions
- Any GPG key in trust DB can encrypt and sign updates

Takeaways

- Small attack surface and a lot was done right:
 - USB ports are disabled during boot
 - Media is deleted from scope once downloaded
 - WPA2 is in use, even if the key cannot be changed
 - API settings are validated on the backend
 - Password protected console and single user mode
 - GPG signed and encrypted software updates

Thanks!

- Travis Goodspeed
- Babak Javadi -- The CORE Group
- Mickey Shkatov -- Intel Advanced Threat Research
- Joe FitzPatrick
- Jesse
- Kenny
- ^H -- Portland's Hackerspace